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Abstract 
 
We examine Marx’s critiques of language, politics, and capitalist political economy 
and show how these anticipated critical discourse and argumentation analysis and 
‘cultural political economy’. Marx studied philology and rhetoric at university and 
applied their lessons critically. We illustrate this from three texts. The German 
Ideology critically explores language as practical consciousness, the division of 
manual and mental labour, the state, hegemony, intellectuals, and specific 
ideologies. The Eighteenth Brumaire studies the semantics and pragmatics of 
political language and how it represents (or misrepresents) the class content of 
politics and contributes to social transformation. Capital deconstructs the categories 
of classical political economy and their constitutive role in capitalist social relations. 
This is one aspect of CPE. Capital also highlights the structural and agential aspects 
of these relations, their contradictory dynamic, and their crisis-prone character. We 
comment on this aspect too. This said, Marx held that social transformation is 
mediated through political imaginaries and highlighted the need for the proletariat to 
develop a ‘poetry’ of the future. We then consider the misleading ‘base-
superstructure’ metaphor and note how, against the thrust of Marx’s work, it tends to 
reify culture. The article concludes that Marx contributed to the critique of semiotic as 
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We examine Marx’s critiques of language, politics, and the capital relation as pre-
theoretical anticipations of critical discourse and argumentation analysis (Fairclough 
& Graham, 2002) and the semiotic turn in ‘cultural political economy’ (Sum & Jessop, 
2013). We illustrate these remarks from four texts: The German Ideology, The 
Eighteenth Brumaire, Capital and its preparatory works (such as the Grundrisse), 
and the ‘Preface’ to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. We 
conclude by putting discourse in its rightful place in Marx’s critique of political 
economy and outlining a theoretical agenda based on this analysis. 
 
Five remarks situate our analysis. First, understanding philology was central to 
university education when Marx was a student thanks in part to Hegel’s effort to 
‘teach philosophy to speak German’, not Latin, so that it could be linked to ordinary 
life and be intelligible to ordinary people, thereby helping to build a German nation 
(Hegel, 1984, p. 107; Harris, 1983, pp. 402–13). Gramsci argued that ‘all men are 
“philosophers”’ and that to win hegemony requires linking everyday spontaneous 
philosophies to more systematic ones through politics (Gramsci 1971, pp. 323, 325; 
1975, Q8, §204). Marx studied at the University of Berlin, founded by Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, who promoted classical studies, comparative philology, and historical 
anthropology (DeGolyer, 1992, pp. 115–19; Patterson, 2009, p. 32; Turner, 2014, pp. 
127–36; cf. Levine, 1987, and Jones, 2016, on the German historical school of law, 
which Marx also studied in Berlin). Second, in this spirit and in the rhetorical tradition 
that he imbibed at school and university, Marx wanted to help the masses to develop 
their own language, their own political imaginary, to better express their needs and 
demands. This holds particularly for subaltern classes. Hence, third, an unstated 
‘guiding thread’ in his theoretical and political practices was ‘translational’ work to 
turn mystifying speculation into a prosaic language suited to a scientific socialist 
programme – supported, as required, by skilful use of rhetoric (cf. Martin, 2015). 
 
Fourth, Marx and Engels aimed to demystify not only religion, like their fellow Young 
Hegelians, but also, unlike them, the secular language of the ruling class, including 
bourgeois morality, bourgeois ‘theory’, and the ideas of leading German intellectuals 
(Cook, 1982; Williams, 1977, pp. 21–26). This goal was central to their approach to 
Ideologiekritik as they deconstructed, ‘debased’, and disclosed the ‘rational kernel’ of 
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the categories and ideas that informed dominant and rival social imaginaries and 
helped construct social relations of domination (on debasing, see Pepperell, 2014). 
 
Fifth, Marx used language skilfully for political as well as scientific effect (Marx, 1979, 
pp. 14–16). Witness The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, which adopts 
powerful literary techniques to narrate the background of the eponymous president’s 
coup d'état (Marx, 1979). Other powerful works in this vein include the Manifesto of 
the Communist Party (Marx and Engels, 1976b) and, perhaps surprisingly, Capital 
(cf. Pepperell, 2010; Jameson, 2013). 
 
The German Ideology: discourse and social structure 
 
We begin with a disparate set of manuscripts that Marx and Engels wrote mainly for 
self-clarification in 1845–46 and subsequently consigned to ‘the gnawing criticism of 
the mice’ (Marx, 1987b, pp. 262–4). They were first printed posthumously in 1924 in 
a factitious compilation, Die deutsche Ideologie (on their subsequent publication 
history, see Carver, 2010). The manuscript on Feuerbach, which became Part I of 
this compilation (Marx & Engels, 1976a, pp. 31–93), has long been widely heralded 
as the foundational text of ‘historical materialism’. It argues that a materialist – as 
opposed to idealist – conception of history should begin with living individuals, not 
abstract man, analysing how they organize material life to satisfy their changing 
needs, broadly defined, and propagate the species. Such activities form humankind’s 
material mode of production and underpin a definite mode of life. The need to 
coordinate interaction with nature and/or other people gives rise to language, which, 
in its plain, ordinary, or everyday form, they write in line with contemporary 
comparative philology, expresses the practical consciousness of nature, other 
humans, and social relations. The unity of hand, larynx, and brain as the biological 
foundation of language is matched on the social level by the unity of production, 
language, and consciousness (Höppe, 1982, p. 28; Marx & Engels, 1976a, pp. 36, 
44; cf. Engels, 1987). In sum, language is treated both as an intellectual force of 
production arising from and enabling social cooperation and as a necessary, 
constitutive part of any mode of life (Marx & Engels, 1976a, pp. 51–60; cf. Marx, 




The text on Feuerbach then comments on social reproduction, political economy, the 
state, hegemony, intellectuals, and specific ideologies. It posits that social 
development involves a growing division between mental and manual labour (Marx & 
Engels, 1976a, p. 60). Moreover, the more that mental is separated from manual 
labour, the greater the tendency to treat ideas as lacking foundations in material life, 
almost as if ideas descend from heaven. In this sense, symbolic forms do not mirror 
social structure (as Durkheim’s sociology of religion [1976] suggests) but, to continue 
the metaphor, are reflections in a series of distorting mirrors that shape construals of, 
and conduct towards, the world in quite diverse ways. In particular, where mental 
production is relatively separate from material production, we find the ‘pure’, even 
esoteric, language of ideologists in such fields as theology, metaphysics, and ethics. 
The same separation inclines intellectuals to explain events and practices in terms of 
free-floating ideas, cut loose from reality (pp. 44–45, 55–56, 92). 
 
Thus, against a common misperception that later parts of this text critique the 
illusions of everyday lived experience, false consciousness, or bourgeois ideological 
manipulation of the masses, they actually critique specific intellectuals and 
ideological currents. The main charge is that they took features specific to diverse 
modern social forms and practices for granted, never considered why these features 
developed when and where they did, and, thanks to this neglect, naturalized them. 
 
Marx and Engels also argued that ideologies differ from other sets of ideas because 
they serve the interests of power and domination; and, relatedly, they explored how 
ideological effects emerge – consciously or not – from language use in diverse 
contexts (cf. Foucault 2000 on truth regimes and, for a more nuanced analysis closer 
to our approach, Weir 2008). Reflecting this, their later efforts at Ideologiekritik 
targeted specific ideologies – technological paradigms, economic doctrines, legal 
systems, political imaginaries, party programmes, religious belief systems, 
philosophies, and general systems of ideas – in terms of how they obscured, 
mystified and legitimated social relations of exploitation and/or domination 
(McCarney, 1980, pp. 10–11). Marx and Engels also recognized that the most 
powerful ideological effects may be sedimented in language, language use, practical 
consciousness, and other forms of signification. Both authors noted the class nature 
of language; its implicit value judgements; its role in spreading bourgeois mentality 
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through turns of phrase, figures of speech, and commercial language; the status of 
economic categories as objective forms of thought; and the mystifying effects of 
commodity fetishism and the juridical worldview (Engels, 1990; Marx, 1967, pp. 29, 
49; Marx, 1987a, pp. 538–41, 547–50; Marx & Engels, 1976a, pp. 102–3, 231; for 
more examples, Höppe, 1982, pp. 97–105, 199–203, 222–47). 
 
Returning to our discussion of the manuscript on Feuerbach, Marx and Engels 
suggested that the state is an independent social form standing above and outside 
society that acts in the name of the latter’s [necessarily deceptive!] collective 
interests. They also interpreted political struggles as the illusory forms in which the 
real struggles of different classes are conducted – a position that was later modified 
(see below). They posited that every class struggling for domination must gain 
political power to represent its interest as the general interest (p. 90). Interests can 
only be articulated through language and this makes it a crucial medium of political 
struggle. They note that the division between manual and mental labour also exists 
within the ruling class itself – which includes both practical ‘men of affairs’ and 
specialists in ideas (p. 60). When this class succeeds in identifying its interests with 
the general interest, its ideas become the ruling ideas. On this basis, ‘the class that 
is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’ 
(p. 59, italics in original). This is grounded, in part, on ruling class control over the 
means of mental as well as material production. These themes are elaborated in 
later individual and joint work. 
 
The Eighteenth Brumaire: discourse and the political 
 
Marx’s account of the background and impact of Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état on 
2nd December 1851 is his most celebrated analysis of politics and state power (on its 
reception, see Reid, 2007). It can be read in part as a critical analysis of the 
semantics and pragmatics of political language. Thus Marx noted, in a widely quoted 
aphorism, that, while ‘men make their own history; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves’ (1979, p. 103). Less often cited is the 
immediately following description of ideational constraints that stem from inherited 
language and outdated worldviews. Here Marx mentioned ‘the tradition of all the 
dead generations’, ‘superstition about the past’, and ‘an entire superstructure of 
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different and distinctly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of 
life’ (pp. 103, 106, 128). Indeed, this text is initially less concerned with the material 
constraints on action than with discursive affordances for, and limitations on, the 
representation of class interests and capacities to win and exercise state power. 
 
Accordingly, Marx explores the articulation between (1) the phrases and tropes of 
language and custom borrowed from the past or recontextualized through 
intertextual weaving in the present and (2) current political and social realities, such 
that old phrases may lead to spirited revolutionary action but, more often, prove to be 
floating signifiers open to political or economic manipulation (Marx, 1979, pp. 103–
12, 126–31, 142–6, 148–50, 190–3 and passim). Louis Bonaparte was the floating 
signifier incarnate. For, as Marx argued in The Class Struggles in France, although 
he was 'the most simple-minded [einfältig] man in France', he had ‘acquired the most 
multiplex [vielfältig] significance. Just because he was nothing, he could signify 
everything’ (1978, p. 81). Different class forces could project their hopes and fears 
onto Bonaparte; Bonaparte, in turn, skilfully manipulated and exploited this 
polyvalence to advance his own interests. To become President through a coup 
d’état, however, more was required. As Marx noted in the preface to the second 
edition, he had aimed to ‘demonstrate how the class struggle in France created 
circumstances and relations that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play 
a hero's part’ (Marx, 1985, p. 57). These circumstances comprised a catastrophic 
equilibrium of social forces, which enabled Bonaparte to seize power with support 
from the army, the Lumpenproletariat, and the smallholding conservative peasantry. 
But this alliance did not represent itself as a class movement but as a national-
popular force to revive the heroic legacies of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 
This analysis highlights the primacy of politics, broadly interpreted, in social 
transformation. For critics of Marxism, this proves the irrelevance of economic class 
analysis (e.g., Hindess, 1978, Hirst, 1977), thereby ignoring Marx’s concern in the 
same text with lasting economic structures and changing economic conjunctures, the 
balance of class forces, and the class relevance of political forces. Conversely, for 
some admirers, it marks a rupture with economic reductionism because it shows that 
political identities, discourse, and representation on the political stage have their own 
dynamic (LaCapra, 1987; Lavin, 2005; Lefort, 1978; Katz, 1992; McLennan, 1981). 
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Other admirers argue that this text anticipates later discourse-theoretical insights into 
the performativity of language, the discursive constitution of identities and interests, 
and their role in shaping the forms and terms of political struggle (Fairclough & 
Graham, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Petrey, 1988; Stallybrass, 1990). 
 
Throughout his text, Marx explores the language and other symbols through which 
the class content of politics gets represented or, more commonly, misrepresented. 
He dissects the semiotic forms, genres, and tropes that political forces employ to 
articulate their identities, interests, and beliefs on the political scene. This comprises 
the visible but nonetheless 'imaginary' world of everyday politics as acted out before 
the public through the open and declared action of organized social forces 
(Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 246–7). Marx employs diverse theatrical metaphors and 
allusions to describe and map the political stage and critically assesses how the 
resulting political theatre is played out by actors who assume different characters, 
masks, and roles in line with changing circumstances, strategies, and moods. Yet he 
also analysed the relation between surface (but nonetheless effective) movements 
acted out on this stage and the deeper social content of political struggles. Indeed, 
Marx wrote that 'as in private life, one differentiates between what a man thinks and 
says of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles one must 
still more distinguish the language and the imaginary aspirations of parties from their 
real organisation and their real interests, their conception of themselves from their 
reality' (1979, p. 128, modified translation). 
 
In this context, Marx studied 'the rude external world' by looking 'behind the scenes' 
of 'the situation and the parties, this superficial appearance, which veils the class 
struggle' (1979, pp. 161, 128, 127). This external world conditions the uneven, often 
disjointed, relation of political struggles to the always contingent interests of 
contending classes and fractions in specific periods and conjunctures and their 
strategic and tactical possibilities. This excludes the positing of abstract, eternal, and 
idealized interests attached to classes identified at the level of a mode of production. 
While this contingent variation holds for all classes, it is stronger for intermediate 
classes (e.g., the petite bourgeoisie), classes with no immediate role in production 




For example, Marx noted how industrialization and the rise of financial capital had 
transformed the class position of the peasantry. Peasants had gained much under 
Napoleon I from land redistribution but its subsequent parcellization and associated 
rise in debt weakened them. Louis Bonaparte claimed to represent the proprietorial 
identity and traditional aspirations of the smallholding conservative peasantry and 
mobilized them as a vital supporting class in his political manoeuvres against other 
social forces, whilst doing little to help them in practice. However, there are limits to 
such dictatorial rule. Thus, some years after his coup, when his largely autonomized 
'rule of the sword' over society was threatened by social unrest, Napoleon III 
retreated and tried to reconnect to bourgeois civil society (Marx, 1986). 
 
Finally, we note three important literary elements of the Brumaire and an important 
political conclusion. First, Marx used language performatively, pedagogically, and 
politically at several levels. He wanted to submit the cult of Napoleon I to ‘the 
weapons of historical research, of criticism, of satire and of wit’ (1985, p. 57). Thus, 
his withering descriptions of Louis Bonaparte also belittled his uncle, Napoleon 
Bonaparte. Likewise, far from being arbitrary, his emplotting of the historical 
background to the 18th Brumaire is organically related to the intended political effects 
of this narrative. This is reflected, second, in the employment of parody to portray the 
ironies in French history. And, third, Marx uses metonymy to show how conjunctural 
simplification and selective subjectivation shape the forms and effectiveness of class 
representation. His historical narratives recognize that ‘metonymy is the only way to 
talk about subjects with capacities for agency; positing a coherent subject position 
from which to act requires denying or ignoring the unstable multiplicity of historical 
forces that form it (Lavin, 2005, p. 444). This anticipated the claim in cultural political 
economy that simplification is vital to ‘going on’ in a complex world (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, pp. 187–90, 217). Marx illustrates this in terms of social agents’ ability to read 
conjunctures, discern potential threats and opportunities, articulate suitable identities 
and interests for social mobilization, and then act effectively on these creative 
assumptions  Lastly, in this context, he argued that, for the proletariat to advance its 
revolutionary interests, it must develop its own political language rather than draw, 





Capital: The discursive deconstruction/debasing of economic categories 
 
Like several key works penned by Marx, Capital is presented as a critique. This time, 
rather than addressing the categories of religion, political philosophy, law, or liberal 
political discourse, it focuses on the categories of classical political economy and 
their role in creating and reproducing capitalist social relations. Marx did not take 
these categories for granted as universal, transhistorical primitives of economic and 
political theory but sought to reveal how they expressed, justified, organized and 
naturalized historically specific social relations of economic exploitation and political 
domination. This approach went well beyond efforts to debunk theories or 
deconstruct them; it extended to a method that Nicole Pepperell calls debasing. 
Deconstruction focuses on the internal conceptual and discursive logic of 
philosophical and literary texts, their underlying assumptions, paradoxes and lack of 
closure, and their efforts to disguise their incoherence. Debasing builds on this 
method to deflate the ‘universalising pretensions’ of high theories such as classical 
political economy and show how their ‘theoretical claims can still be preserved and 
appropriated to make sense of some specific and limited aspect of social practice’ 
(Pepperell, 2014, p. 4). Marx aims to show that the categories of classical and vulgar 
political economy are necessary illusions that systematically misrepresent real 
referents in ‘the rude external world’ of capitalist social formations. In short, they are 
socially valid – indeed, performative – but only for a specific mode of production. 
Assuming their universal validity obscures this historical truth relation. 
 
This approach is most evident in the so-called fourth volume of Capital, namely, 
Theories of Surplus-Value, which deconstructs and debases key themes in classical 
political economy (Marx, 1976). It is also a leitmotiv of the three main volumes, 
whether published under Marx’s authority or Engels’s editorship. For example, Marx 
argues in Volume I that classical political economy, with its genuine scientific 
achievements, degenerated into the bourgeois apologetics of vulgar political 
economy as the working-class movement became stronger and challenged the logic 
of capital (Marx, 1967, pp. 23–26). 
 
In this context, Capital I begins with the observation that the ‘wealth of those 
societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as an 
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“immense accumulation of commodities”’ (Marx, 1967a, p. 43). Starting with the 
commodity with this almost self-evident feature of everyday life in bourgeois 
societies and treating it as the economic cell-form of the capital relation, Marx initially 
focused on two key features of this relation. First, goods and services are produced 
as commodities with a view to sale for monetary profit rather than immediate 
consumption by their producers. So they had to have exchange-value as well as 
use-value. Second, more importantly, workers’ labour-power acquires the form of a 
commodity, sold and bought on the labour market, although it is actually a fictitious 
commodity. The consequences of treating it here and in the labour process as if it 
were a commodity are the features that most distinguish capitalist from pre-capitalist 
economic formations. Marx also claimed, against the fetishized and fetishizing 
categories of bourgeois political economy, that all ‘value-added’ produced in 
capitalism (hence the total surplus value available for reinvestment or redistribution 
in the form of profits of enterprise, interest, or rent) is entirely due to the exertion of 
labour-power rather than deriving, as vulgar political economy suggests, from the 
contributions of productive capital, money, or land as well as labour. Whether value 
is added depends, however, on capital’s ability to control workers in the labour 
process – with this economic struggle typically hidden from view when commodities 
reach the market. Marx proceeded to analyse many other economic aspects of 
capitalism in terms of the performative but mystifying effect of related economic 
categories – for example, prices, profits, interest, and ground rent. Marx also showed 
that political and ideological struggles are conditioned by categories and institutions 
that are peculiar to the bourgeois political sphere and civil society – such as the 
capitalist form of the sovereign state based on the rule of law. 
 
On this basis, Marx defined some fundamental laws rooted in the generalization of 
the commodity form to labour-power, the competition among capitalists for surplus 
profits, and the institutional separation of the profit-oriented, market economy from 
the juridico-political sphere and wider civil society. These laws do not operate with 
iron necessity as an external force but are actualized as tendencies in and through 
different forms of class struggle in specific conjunctures – struggles that involve, inter 
alia, the continued reproduction and affirmation of the categories (and associated 
forms of thought) that orient actions that have their own emergent structural effects 
and crisis-tendencies that operate ‘behind the backs of the producers’ (Marx, 1967, 
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p. 135). Thus, a key theme in Capital is the improbable renewal of the capital relation 
– whether due to the problematic spatio-temporal and social coordination of different 
capitals or to the disruptions introduced through competition or class struggle and 
other forms of resistance. Capitalist reproduction may appear ‘natural’ but is always 
mediated through social practices, which have both discursive and extra-discursive 
moments. These relations are also subject to reflexive reorganization to modify the 
process of differential accumulation and stakes of competition and struggle. These 
arguments prefigure contemporary work on the performative role of economic 
imaginaries in reproducing the capital relation, shaping accumulation regimes or 
varieties of capitalism, and guiding crisis-management (e.g., de Rycker & Don, 2013; 
Erreygers & Jacob, 2006; Hauf, 2015; Jessop, Fairclough & Wodak, 2008; Maesse 
2013; Rooney, Hearn & Ninan, 2005). 
 
Base and superstructure: Discourse and the economy 
 
The discussion of the materialist conception of history in The German Ideology and 
the 1859 Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx 
1987b) are emblematic texts. They are often claimed to show that Marx had a 
reductionist model of the social world in which an economic base generates a 
matching juridico-political superstructure, forms of life, and social consciousness. 
This model had different functions in the two texts. In the text on Feuerbach, its role 
was diacritical. On the one hand, it shifted attention from an idealist critique of 
religion and theology to a materialist critique of law and politics; and, on the other, in 
treating language as practical consciousness, its materialist stance excluded any 
claim that the social world can exist prior to thought. In the 1859 Preface, however, 
the base-superstructure metaphor had two diversionary roles. First, pragmatically, it 
was penned to lull the Prussian censors into approving the Contribution for 
publication (Prinz, 1969). For, it implied that, as a scientific monograph, based on 
years of disinterested research, it was neither a work of propaganda nor an attempt 
to intervene in Prussian politics. Moreover, underlining the book’s non-threatening 
nature, its Preface stated that capitalism would end only when its growth potential 
was exhausted and the social relations of capitalist production had become fetters 
on further economic development (Marx, 1987b, p. 263). Thus, in contrast to the 
Manifesto, working class struggle, revolutionary or reformist, was a taboo subject. 
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Second, theoretically, Gareth Stedman Jones suggests that Marx had to resort to the 
mechanical base-superstructure metaphor because his Contribution lacked the 
often-promised – and, for a critique of the capitalist mode of production, essential – 
chapter on capital. So, unable to refer to the historically specific contradictions of the 
capital relation, Marx resorted to the more generic dialectical contradiction between 
the material forces and social relations of production (Jones, 2016, pp. 408–10). 
 
The famous guiding principle outlined in the Preface states that the articulation of 
the material forces and social relations of production ‘constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness’ 
(1987b, p. 263). Note that Marx does not posit unilateral causal relations here. 
Furthermore, ‘changes in this economic foundation sooner or later transform the 
whole immense superstructure … the legal, political, religious, artistic or 
philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this 
conflict and fight it out’ (ibidem). This implies a reciprocal influence of these 
discursive (but also institutional) forms on economic development. 
 
This innocuous scientific guideline, reminiscent of the text on Feuerbach, was 
relegated to a footnote in Capital (Marx, 1976, p. 86n). Yet the Preface has won 
inordinate significance – especially as Engels hailed it as the definitive statement of 
the scientific principles and laws of historical materialism, highlighting the ultimately 
determining role of the economy in historical development. However, as Terrell 
Carver noted, when reduced to a mechanical base-superstructure metaphor, this 
guideline betrays the richness of Marx’s critique of political economy and historical 
analyses. Consequently: 
 
[t]he better-illustrated discussions of the Manifesto, the more intensely 
political analysis in The Eighteenth Brumaire, and the more exploratory 
conceptual studies in the economic works, from the Grundrisse through the 
various drafts and published volumes of Capital, were then ‘rigorously’ judged 




As suggested above, the most serious misreading of this metaphor – 
emphasized in official Marxism – claims that the economic base mechanically 
and unilaterally determines the form and content of the juridico-political 
superstructure and forms of social consciousness. This reifies culture as an 
epiphenomenon of the economic base. At least four problems arise here. First, it 
is inconsistent with Marx’s dialectical approach as developed no later than the 
manuscript on Feuerbach, which emphasized the mutual relations between the 
three ‘levels’ of a social formation. Second, while Marx’s materialist approach to 
history did start from the social relations of production, he generally argued that 
social transformation is mediated through political action. Indeed, he asserted the 
primacy of the political over the economic when there were economic crises. 
Third, Marx and Engels insisted that sense- and meaning-making are not 
confined to the superstructure but are co-constitutive of all social practices and 
interaction. This excludes treating the economic base one-sidedly just as it 
excludes the ideological temptation of reifying culture in the manner of 
ideological ‘dealers in ideas’. 
 
Fourth, if there is a rational kernel rather than ideological deformation at the heart of 
the base-superstructure metaphor it would, once more, be a historically specific 
feature of capitalist social formations, not a universally valid, transhistorical constant. 
Only in these formations are classes defined through social relations of production 
that are disembedded from broader institutional forms (such as kinship, political 
bonds, or religion). In introducing the cash nexus into all spheres of society, modern 
capitalism overturned traditional social ties, freeing social relations to be shaped by 
the capital–labour relation and the profit-oriented, market-mediated dynamic of 
accumulation. However, as Karl Polanyi (1944) observed, once disembedded from 
traditional society, the capitalist market economy needs to be re-embedded in a 
market society. This requires a certain conformity or coherence among the economic 
order, the juridico-political superstructure, and forms of consciousness. But this is a 
dialectical relation, not a mechanical, one-sided one; and it must be created through 
specific and precarious practices that can at best produce a temporary and 
provisional relation of formal and material adequacy between the social relations of 
production and the wider social formation. Gramsci developed similar arguments on 
how a relatively coherent ‘historical bloc’ emerges to reflect ‘the necessary 
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reciprocity between structure and superstructure’ (1971: 366; 1975, Q8, §182); and 
likewise argues that this reciprocity is realized, to the extent that it is, through specific 




Marx offered a totalizing perspective on social relations in terms of the historically 
specific conditions of existence, dynamic, and repercussions of the social 
organization of production. This does not commit him to the view that the world 
comprises a closed totality that is unified and governed by a single principle of 
societal organization (e.g., capital accumulation) or that taking economic 
organization as an entry-point to social analysis is the only scientifically valid or 
politically sound approach. On the contrary, it poses questions regarding the 
conditions in which one or another principle becomes dominant or even hegemonic 
and what is the most appropriate entry-point for exploring different social formations. 
This depends in part on the performative and creative role of language in orienting 
social practices in terms of specific categories of thought and action throughout a 
social formation. Sense- and meaning-making (semiosis) are essential to all social 
relations – not just those that are abstracted therefrom and categorised as 
‘superstructural’ or ‘cultural’. This excludes any simplistic base-superstructure model 
as well as an idealist approach to historical explanation. It does not exclude – 
indeed, it demands – analysis of the variable causal weight of specific sets of 
semiotic–material relations in different conjunctures and the circumstances in which 
one or another set of practices enable social forces to make their own history. 
 
We conclude that much of Marx’s work can be read as a series of contributions to 
the critique of semiotic economy, that is, to an account of how language and 
symbolism are involved in the emergence of specific forms of social organization and 
contribute to the imaginary (mis)recognition and (mis)representation of class (and 
other social) interests. As Norman Fairclough and Phil Graham argue, Marx 
anticipated much of what would now be regarded as critical discourse and/or 




the dialectical interconnectivity of language and other elements of the social 
and can therefore do full justice to [the] social power of language in … 
capitalism without reducing social life to language, removing language from 
material existence, or reifying language (Fairclough & Graham, 2002, p. 187). 
 
Marx interpreted language as an expression of practical consciousness and critiqued 
the manual–mental division of labour, which inclined intellectuals to believe that 
ideas were the motor force of history. He engaged in systematic, even symptomatic, 
critiques of the basic categories that organized capitalist relations of production and 
adapted, modified, and ‘translated’ into corresponding juridico–political, intellectual, 
and philosophical social forms and consciousness. Given that politics, not the 
evolution of the productive forces, was the key moment of social development, Marx 
also explored what nowadays one might call the semantics and pragmatics of 
political discourse and specificities of political struggle in bourgeois societies, which 
involved articulating and securing support for an account of the (always illusory) 
general interest that could help for a while to stabilize an inherently contradictory, 
crisis–prone capitalist social order. His semiotic analyses were grounded in his early 
philosophical and theoretical studies but remained largely pre–theoretical and 
unsystematic, however, as they served significant heuristic and political purposes. 
Marx was a pre-disciplinary scholar who focused on the critique and transformation 
of bourgeois society. Later advances in critical discourse and argumentation analysis 
could be used to refine his concepts and systematize his methodological tools. This 
is what we have been attempting in our development of cultural political economy 
(Sum & Jessop, 2013). But, as we also argue, this should not be pursued at the cost 
of undermining the scope for integrating critical semiotic analysis into the more 
systematic critique of political economy. This was Marx’s principal intellectual project. 
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